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Regulate Artificial Intelligence To Avert Cyber Arms Race 
Define an international doctrine for cyberspace skirmishes before they escalate into conventional 
warfare, urge Mariarosaria Taddeo and Luciano Floridi.  
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Cyber-attacks are becoming more frequent, sophisticated, and destructive. Each day the US suffers 
more than 4,000 ransomware ttacks that encrypt computer files until the owner pays to release them 
[1]. This is triple the number in 2015. In May 2017, when WannaCry virus crippled hundreds of IT 
systems across the UK’s National Health Service, 20,000 appointments were cancelled. A month later, 
the NotPetya ransomware cost pharmaceutical giant Merck, shipping firm Maersk, and logistics 
company FedEx around $300 million each in immediate damages. Global damages from cyber-attacks 
totalled $5 billion in 2017 and may reach $6 trillion a year by 2021. States are partly behind this rise. 
They use cyber-attacks both offensively and defensively. For example, North Korea has been linked to 
WannaCry, Russia to NotPetya.   
As the threats escalate, so do defence strategies. Since 2012, the US has employed ‘active’ cyber 
defence strategies that enable computer experts to neutralise or distract viruses with decoy targets, 
and to break back into a hacker’s system to delete data or to destroy it completely. In 2016, the UK 
announced a £1.9bn investment and a 5-year plan to combat cyber threats. NATO also began drafting 
principles for such operations, to be agreed by 2019. The US and the UK are leading this initiative, with 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain also involved [2].  
Artificial intelligence (AI) is poised to revolutionize this activity. Attacks and responses will become 
faster, more precise, and more disruptive. Threats will be dealt with in hours, not days or weeks. AI 
solutions are being rolled out that can verify code and identify bugs and vulnerabilities, making the 
digital systems they protect more robust. For example, in April 2017 software firm DarkTrace launched 
Antigena, which uses machine learning to spot abnormal behaviour on an IT network, shut off 
communications to that part of the system, and issue an alert. Implementations of AI in cyber security 
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will become increasingly pervasive. According to some estimates, the value of AI in cyber security will 
reach $18.2 billion by 2023 (Figure 1). 
Experts welcome the potential of AI to improve system verification and robustness [6]. However, this 
potential is crippled by two risks: the escalation of responses and the lack of control over snowballing 
effects that AI-led counter-attacks may have. Thus, it is crucial that experts ensure transparency about 
problems, limitations, and possible shortcomings of unregulated uses of AI for defence, while also 
working with policy-makers and end users to design adequate testing and oversight mechanisms for 
this technology. 
By the end of this decade, many states plan to deploy AI for national cyber defence [4,5]. AI makes 
deterrence possible [3] because algorithms can identify the source and neutralise it without having to 
identify the actor behind it, so that attacks can be punished. Currently, countries hesitate to push back 
because they are unsure who is responsible, given that campaigns may be waged through third-party 
computers and often use common software. 
The risk is a cyber arms-race [6]. As states use increasingly aggressive AI-driven strategies, opponents 
will respond ever more fiercely. Such a vicious cycle might lead ultimately to a physical attack.  
States need regulations that establish legitimate uses of AI for national defence, shape the process 
leading to the deployment of AI, such as testing and auditing mechanisms, and define the chain of 
responsibilities [7]. Cyberspace is a domain of warfare and AI is a new defence capability, so 
regulations are necessary for state use of AI, much like there exist regulations for the other domains 
of warfare – air, see, land, and space – and the corresponding military capabilities. What is long 
overdue are criteria for determining proportional responses; clear thresholds, so called ‘red lines’, for 
distinguishing legal and illegal cyber-attacks; and appropriate sanctions for illegal acts [8]. In each case, 
unilateral approaches will be ineffective. Rather, it is crucial to define an international doctrine for 
state action in cyberspace. Alarmingly, international efforts to regulate cyber conflicts have stalled. 




Right now the UN process is in deadlock. In 2004, the United Nations set up a Group of Governmental 
Experts (UN GGE) to agree on a set of voluntary rules for how states should behave in cyberspace. 
Their 5th meeting in 2017 ended in a stand-off. The Group could not reach consensus on whether 
existing international laws on self-defence, humanitarian laws, and state responsibility should apply 
in cyberspace. The US argued cyber-defence regulations should build on these foundations. Other 
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nations, including Cuba, Russia, and China, firmly disagreed, arguing that this would ‘militarize’ 
cyberspace, sending the wrong message about peaceful conflict resolution. The Group failed to deliver 
its report. It is unclear whether it will meet again, or what will happen next.  
International dialogue and action must resume. NATO could pave the way through its forthcoming 
guidelines. Although it is currently unclear what their scope will be.  
Meanwhile, research on AI for cyber defence is progressing fast. The US is in the lead, technologically. 
It aims to incorporate AI into its cyber-defence systems by 2019 [4]. The Department of Defense (DoD) 
has earmarked $150 million for research. The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) is developing techniques to do this. Steps have already been taken. In its 2016 Cyber Grand 
Challenge competition, seven AI systems, developed by academics and private companies from 
Greece, Russia, Switzerland, and the US played against each other, identifying and targeting 
opponents’ weaknesses, while finding and patching their own.  
The DoD will issue the first US report on AI strategies for national defence in May. There is no 
indication of what its approach will be. Previous documents, like the 2015 US Cyber Strategy or the 
2016 National Cyber Incident Response Plan, did not cover autonomous systems, machine learning, 
or AI. The 2012 DoD Directive on ‘Autonomy in Weapon Systems’ [9] focused on internal procedures 
for deploying AI, but was silent on when the US would do so in the international arena.  
AI is a priority for China, which aims to become a world leader in machine learning technologies. In 
July 2017, the Chinese government issued its AI Development Plan [5]. Military implementation of AI, 
on the battlefield as well as in cyberspace, is a crucial part of the strategy. But it is unclear to what 
degree China plans to deploy AI actively in cyber defence.   
Russia has not released any public documents about its strategies for AI in defence. However, in a 
video message released in 2017, President Putin expressly referred to AI and stated “whoever 
becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world”. Experts agree that Russia is 
focusing on developing AI-enhanced tools for its conventional forces. However, since 2014, the 
Russian National Defense Control Center (NDCC) has also used machine learning algorithms to detect 
online threats. Allegedly, Russia has pioneered the use of AI to spread disinformation and intervene 
in the public debate of other nations, like in the case of the US Presidential election and the UK 
European Union membership referendum, in 2016. Although these operations are not part of national 
defence strategies, they speak to the level of AI capabilities developed by Russia over the past two 
years. 
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North Korea has a history of cyberspace aggression. WannaCry in 2016 and the cyber-attack against 
Sony Picture in 2014 are two good example of North Korea aggressive attitude in cyberspace. The 
country lacks technical expertise in AI but is likely to want to catch up with its adversaries.  
The EU is stepping-up too. In 2017, it reassessed cyber security and defence policies and launched the 
European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. EU directives present the most 
comprehensive regulatory framework for state conduct in cyberspace to date. Yet they do not go far 
enough. The EU treats cyber defence as a case of cyber security, to be improved passively by making 
member states’ information systems more resilient. It disregards active uses of cyber defence and 
does not include AI. This is a missed opportunity. The EU could have begun defining ‘red lines’ and 
proportionate responses. For example, the EU Directive on Security of Network and Information 
Systems [10] provides criteria for identifying critical national infrastructures, such as health systems 
or key energy and water supplies that should be protected. The same criteria could be used to define 
illegitimate targets of state-sponsored cyber-attacks.  
Regional forums, like NATO and the EU, must take the following three steps to avoid serious imminent 
attacks on state infrastructures and to maintain international stability.     
 
Three steps 
Define legal boundaries. The international community needs to agree urgently upon ‘red lines’ 
distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate targets and definitions of proportionate responses for cyber 
defence strategies. International consensus at the UN level will ultimately be required. Until then 
guidelines from regional multilateral bodies, like NATO and the EU, must cover these issues and lead 
by example.  
Test strategies with allies. ‘Sparring’ exercises should be organised between friendly countries to test 
AI-based defence tactics. These tests should be mandatory before any system is deployed. They could 
be in the form of DARPA’s Grand Challenge or the cyber simulation exercises routinely run by NATO 
and the EU. Because AI learns by experience, these matches will improve the strategies of the alliance, 
while finding and healing weaknesses. Fatal vulnerabilities of key systems and crucial infrastructures 
should be shared with allies; policy frameworks should demand disclosure. Agreements and 
regulations with similar sharing and disclosure requirements include the EU eIDAS 
(electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services) Regulation and the IPA (Industry 
Partnership Agreement) within NATO.  
Monitor and enforce rules. The international community needs to agree on how to audit and oversee 
AI-based state cyber defence operations. Alert and remedy mechanisms are needed to address 
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mistakes and unintended consequences. A third-party authority with teeth, such as the UN Security 
Council, should rule on whether red lines, proportionality, responsible deployment or disclosure 
norms have been breached. As in the case with other international norms, economic or political 
sanctions should be imposed on states violating rules. NATO and the EU should enforce the norms 
within their remits.  
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